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Magazineagreed-upon moral precepts, such 
as telling the truth and not harming 
others, are rules for living together 
that any intelligent gregarious beings 
would put into their social contracts, 
needing no divine sanction. In contrast, 
little good can come from parochial 
doctrines that cannot be justifi ed by 
universal standards of reason. Coyne 
doesn’t dwell on obvious historical 
disasters, such as religious wars and 
persecutions, but he devotes a section 
apiece to some of the more insidious 
harms fostered by faith today: the 
withholding of medical care to sick 
children, the suppression of heretical 
biomedical research and public-health 
policies, the opposition to assisted 
dying, and the denial that anything 
should be done about anthropogenic 
climate change. In several sections, 
Coyne plays the ultimate empiricist 
trump card: data from Greg Paul 
showing that the godless democracies 
of northern and western Europe are 
thriving, while the religious ones — most 
pointedly the United States — have far 
higher rates of societal dysfunction, 
such as violent crime, preventable 
disease, and mediocre education. 
In his book, Coyne has examined 
every talking point in the New Atheism 
debate but one: the allegedly shrill, 
militant, extremist, fundamentalist 
tone of the anti-God squad. Here he 
leads by example. Faith Versus Fact is 
unquestionably partisan, but its tone is 
matter-of-fact, and the offense that its 
targets will surely take will come from 
the force of his arguments rather than 
any ridicule or cheap shots. Indeed, my 
only real criticism of the book is that it 
has been stripped of the sass and wit 
that enliven his blog whyevolutionistrue. 
Nonetheless, Faith Versus Fact is clear 
and gripping, and should be read 
by anyone interested in the tension 
between science and religion. By 
meeting the claims of the faitheists and 
accommodationists head-on, Coyne 
shows that in this debate the two 
sides aren’t preaching to their choirs 
or talking past each other, and that 
the truth does not always fall halfway 
between two extremes. 
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What fi rst attracted you to biology? 
This goes back to my youth, and my 
curiosity about how life could have 
arisen. I was (and remain) overwhelmed 
with curiosity and awe about how 
life could arise from inanimate ‘stuff’. 
How could mere stuff spawn the 
existence of organized, living systems? 
How could the stuff of physics give 
rise to conscious minds that pose 
questions about their own existence 
and experiences? Evolutionary theory 
provides an understanding of how 
different forms of life could evolve 
through processes of natural selection, 
but it already presupposes the 
existence of life; it says nothing about 
how systems that could be subjected 
to selective pressures arose in the 
fi rst place. The term ‘random’ was 
offered as a means of creating options 
within living systems, but it seemed 
utterly useless in explaining how living 
systems came to be, or possess the 
kinds of qualities unique to living 
systems. 
So I presume this led you to study 
biology at University? My main 
passion when I left high school was 
biology. Somewhat ironically, however, 
I could not take a biology course in 
my fi rst year attending University, 
because I had succeeded in passing 
an advanced placement test. An idiotic 
bureaucratic policy precluded fi rst 
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course until my second year, so I was 
left to explore other fi elds. I fell in love 
with the life offered at University; an 
environment dedicated to the pursuit 
of all forms of knowledge, populated 
by people that were as curious as I 
was about nature and our place in it. 
I explored topics that could provide a 
deeper understanding of what it meant 
to be, to know, to understand, and 
explain; both the nature of the physical 
world, and the nature of knowledge 
and understanding. I was young, and 
was obsessed with the big questions. 
Those interests remain and underpin 
everything that I do, but the realities and 
pragmatics of producing research has 
relegated these issues to the implicit 
background of most of my work.
How did you come to study 
perception? A friend of mine told me 
that there was a purportedly brilliant 
but incomprehensible Professor of 
Psychology (Robert Shaw) who taught 
a course in perception. It was here 
that I felt like all of my major interests 
came together. Perception involves the 
intersection of knowing and being, of 
epistemology and ontology. It involved 
all of the sciences, and some of the 
deepest issues in philosophy. I felt 
like I had found a topic that allowed 
me to explore all of my intellectual 
passions in one fi eld. What does it 
mean to have a scientifi c explanation 
of perception, or of psychology more 
generally? If biological systems are 
the products of natural physical 
processes, which are governed by 
physical laws, then it seemed natural 
to expect that psychological processes 
should also be expressible as laws. 
The approach being pursued by 
the Ecological Perception group to 
which Shaw belonged (headed by 
himself and Michael Turvey) was to 
understand psychological processes as 
a particular kind of physics. To this end, 
they looked for theoretical guidance 
from the physics of self-organization, 
and sought to understand how the 
concept of ‘laws’ could be extended to 
psychological processes. I began by 
attempting to understand what it meant 
for something to be a natural (physical) 
law, and then turned my attention to the 
fi eld of nonlinear thermodynamics and 
statistical mechanics to understand the 
basis of self-organization in physics.
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law? The answer to this question has 
evolved over time, so the use of the 
past tense is probably inappropriate. 
My earliest insights emerged only 
after I fully engaged in taking physics 
courses, which occurred when I was 
in graduate school in the psychology 
department at Vanderbilt. I discovered 
that it was possible to fulfi ll the 
course requirements for my PhD in 
psychology by taking physics and 
math courses, so this is what I did. 
My fi rst insight was that natural 
laws identify the key observables of a 
system — the information that needs 
to be tracked to predict a system’s 
behavior. One of the most fundamental 
problems of science is identifying the 
variables that defi ne the dimensions 
of the ‘state space’ that are needed to 
characterize the behaviors of a system; 
the observables that enter into laws 
specify what those variables are, and 
the formal relations captured in the law 
defi ne the possible states a system 
can be in. My second insight was 
understanding that the laws of physics 
have two aspects: The syntactic form 
of the law, which is presumed to be 
universal, inviolable, and temporally 
invariant; and the parameters 
and ‘context’ (including initial and 
boundary conditions), which can only 
be established through measurement. 
In physics, the form of the law is what 
is taken as primary, and the context is 
taken as incidental. 
Although this view has served 
physical theory well, this distinction is 
much more diffi cult to make in biology 
and psychology. Biological systems 
are the products of evolution and are 
as much a product of their history — a 
set of embodied historical accidents — 
as they are of inviolable laws. This is 
one of the things that make biology 
and psychology so diffi cult as 
sciences: A theory of biological and 
psychological processes involves 
reconstructing the fi tness function 
that shaped our evolutionary history, 
which is required to answer questions 
about why particular behaviors and 
functions exist.
How did your understanding of 
the physics of self-organization 
infl uence your work in perception? 
It seemed self-evident to me that the 
problem of perceptual organization Cmust exploit the same kind of self-
organizing principles that underlie the 
origin and maintenance of biology 
systems. In perception, the idea of 
‘cooperative processes’ (another 
name given to self-organizing 
processes) had been invoked to 
explain how information from our two 
eyes was organized into a coherent 
percept. I found a way to test this 
idea psychophysically. Much to my 
dismay, the idea was not only false, 
precisely the opposite was true. 
Once I accepted this fact, I asked 
the obvious question: if this idea is 
wrong, why is it wrong? The answer 
came once I considered what it would 
mean if perceptual organization 
excessively relied on processes of 
self-organization. The purpose of 
perceptual systems is to provide 
an animal with behaviorally relevant 
information about the world. In order 
to be functional, perceptual systems 
must be reliable ‘reporters’ of relevant 
world properties, not prodigious 
generators of structure that refl ects its 
internal dynamics. 
What did you learn from this 
mistake? At the most general 
level, this rather spectacular failure 
reminded me of the central role that 
experiments play in assessing ideas. 
More importantly, the fact that an 
idea proves to be wrong provides 
a unique opportunity for learning. 
Students usually get excited when an 
idea is supported by data; but there 
is potentially as much or more to be 
gained from the way in which data 
fail to support an idea. In my case, I 
realized that the kinds of cooperative 
processes that had been invoked to 
explain binocular matching would 
cause very signifi cant problems along 
occlusion boundaries, which would 
interfere with the visual system’s ability 
to segment objects. I therefore turned 
my attention to this segmentation 
problem, and was fortunate to 
make a number of striking empirical 
discoveries that shaped a series of 
theoretical papers that I subsequently 
wrote on these topics. 
Why do you study what you do now? 
I am interested in understanding why 
we have the perceptual experiences 
that we do. Although this seems to 
be the defi nition of perception, it urrent Biology 25, R635–R653, August 3, 2015 forms only a small part of what vision 
scientists actually study. 
My work focuses on two very 
general problems in vision, which 
can be captured under the general 
headings of analysis and synthesis. 
The analysis problem involves 
understanding how the visual system 
decomposes the input into what I have 
termed causal sources. The structure in 
light that reaches our eyes is generated 
by a variety of different causes in the 
world: the three-dimensional shapes 
of objects, their refl ectance properties 
(their color, lightness, and gloss), their 
transmittance properties (translucency 
and transparency), and the light fi eld. 
When we look at a scene, we have the 
impression that we are very good at 
distinguishing these different sources 
of image structure. We perceive the 
world as containing objects with 
specifi c shapes, colors, and material 
properties that are illuminated in a 
particular way. We do not typically 
confuse shadow boundaries with 
changes in pigmentation or changes 
in surface orientation, or changes 
in surface color with changes in the 
illuminant. It is far from clear, however, 
how the visual system accomplishes 
this remarkable computational 
feat. Indeed, many assume that 
this decomposition problem is 
computationally intractable.
The problem of synthesis is more 
closely aligned with my earlier interests 
in self-organizing systems. There are 
a host of phenomena that involve the 
visual system imposing structure on 
the input, which includes a broad class 
of perceptual grouping phenomena 
and processes of visual interpolation. 
These phenomena provide a unique 
window into the intrinsic dynamics of 
the neural circuits, since the perceived 
structure that emerges cannot be 
derived explicitly from the images. 
Do you have any scientifi c heroes? 
Of a sort, yes. As an undergraduate, 
my mentors Bob Shaw and Michael 
Turvey were inspirational. They were 
exemplary scholars who exposed 
me to some of the deepest thinkers 
in physics, theoretical biology, and 
philosophy. Their passion for science 
was infectious, and their rigor, depth, 
and scholarship were exemplary. In 
this regard, they were nearly ideal role 
models, although I don’t subscribe ©2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved R641
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today. Apart from my mentors, one 
of the most important fi gures in my 
intellectual development was the work 
of the theoretical biologist Robert 
Rosen. His book Fundamentals of 
Measurement and Representation of 
Natural Systems had a huge infl uence 
on my understanding of what it 
meant to do science. It provided a 
general sense for the interrelated 
concepts of measurement, 
observables, and representation, 
concepts that are indispensible in the 
fi eld of perception. This work also 
provided the most lucid arguments 
why reductionist explanations fail 
to provide a complete explanation 
of biological organization, and by 
extension, psychology. 
Rosen’s subsequent book, 
Anticipatory Systems, went further, 
and explored the relationship between 
natural systems and their formal 
(mathematical) images, what he called 
the ‘modeling relation’. As the name 
suggests, it was also a treatise on 
what it meant for a system’s behavior 
to be anticipatory — to contain 
predictive or anticipatory models — 
in contrast to the merely ‘reactive’ 
systems studied by physicists. To 
my knowledge, Rosen provides 
the only (or at least best) answer to 
the question: why can the world be 
modeled with mathematics? I think 
it should be required reading for all 
scientists, as it provides not just a 
general answer to this question, but 
provides a clear sense for how the goal 
of science is to fi nd a formal image 
of a system that is suffi ciently rich to 
capture its full range of behaviors. 
Many scientists simply presume the 
completeness or suffi ciency of a 
particular kind of formalism because 
it has worked for some other (typically 
simpler) system. 
What are your greatest concerns 
about the future of science? One 
of my biggest concerns is the impact 
of the growing corporate culture in 
Universities, and the push for ‘big’ 
science. We are currently witnessing 
the economic consequences of the 
increasing concentration of power 
to a handful of corporate interests 
in society at large, so we have a 
model of how this is likely to play 
out in the context of universities and R642 Current Biology 25, R635–R653, Augusscience. A lot of the problem has to 
do with how issues are framed. Words 
like ‘accountability’ and ‘impact’ 
are the new benchmarks used to 
gauge success and contribution of 
a scientist. People count citations 
without regard for whether a paper 
is cited positively or negatively, or 
whether (or how ‘much’) a paper has 
advanced a fi eld. There is also often 
no attempt to assess the relative size 
of different fi elds, which places small 
or emerging fi elds at a competitive 
disadvantage. In many fi elds — like 
psychology — the size of the fi eld 
may primarily refl ect how interesting 
it is to students. Citations are usually 
also collected over a short window of 
time, which can grossly misrepresent 
the speed with which scientifi c 
achievements are processed and 
incorporated. There is this view that 
there is a pressing need to measure 
something, to assess something, 
without any clear model of what that 
something is. The main virtue of 
this particular form of accountability 
is that it’s ‘objective’, a word that 
carries with it the patina of something 
scientifi c, when it simply means that 
it can be automated. And this bias 
is growing. Universities around the 
world are using such measurements 
to assess the ‘quality’ of a university, 
which creates a bias to hire people 
who advance these measures, which 
reinforces the kind of science that 
fares well under this system, which 
creates more demand for the kind of 
science that produces citations. This 
is even happening at the top journals, 
which now emphasize the need for 
doing interdisciplinary work (or at 
least employs multiple methods). 
This also increases the number of 
fi elds that could cite the paper, which 
infl ates the citation index of the 
journal, which reinforces the bias for 
‘big’ science.
The fi elds of biology and psychology 
are arguably best placed to fi ght this 
trend, although I don’t see a concerted 
effort in this direction. The concept of 
variability is arguably one of the most 
central concepts in biology. If we want 
to increase the potential for new ideas, 
we won’t accomplish this by funneling 
all of the resources to a few individuals 
or groups. The concepts of validity 
and reliability are the most basic 
concepts introductory psychology t 3, 2015 ©2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reservedstudents are exposed to. The issue is 
whether your proposed measure of X 
is a valid measure of X, not whether 
you reliably get the same answer 
each time you apply it. It amazes me 
how complacent and defeatist people 
are about this, assuming that it is a 
fait accompli. But as the people that 
ascend to positions of power do so 
on the back of these measures, the 
damage will already be done.
Note that the same issue arises in 
the context of education in science. 
The move to replace the broad 
diversity of course offerings with a 
small number of out-sourced massive 
open online courses (MOOCs) will 
fail to provide the kind of intellectual 
diversity needed to ensure the kind 
of intellectual variability needed to 
maintain a healthy collection of new 
ideas. 
What about the push for applied 
science? I think that this is one of the 
most tragically short-sighted visions 
that continues to grow internationally. 
The evidence for the long-term 
economic benefi ts of basic research 
have been very well documented. 
For the most part, the people who 
do the best basic science are not the 
same people that do the best applied 
science. The former are concerned 
with discovering how the world 
works, whereas applied scientists 
are concerned with applying insights 
from basic science to affect a certain 
end. The basic scientist is motivated 
by truth and curiosity, whereas the 
applied scientist is motivated to create 
something to serve some function. 
They’re both needed, but they are two 
different forms of activity performed 
by people that are motivated by 
different kinds of goals. The attempt 
to force everyone into being applied 
scientists will result in reducing the 
very source of information needed 
for applied work. In terms of any 
cost benefi t analysis to society, basic 
science is cheap and under-invested. 
This would be evident to politicians 
if they just bothered to look at the 
data on the economic returns from 
their meager investments into basic 
science.
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